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COMMENTS

WILSON v. SPAIN: WILL PRETRIAL
DETAINEES ESCAPE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL "TWILIGHT ZONE"?
IRENE M. BAKER,

INTRODUCTION
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil remedy to individuals who

are deprived of constitutional rights through the use of excessive
force by law enforcement officials.' In examining an excessive
force claim brought under § 1983, the Supreme Court dictates
the analysis begin "by identifying the specific constitutional right
2
allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force."
Courts examining claims of excessive force by law enforcement
officials have found, depending upon the particular
Eighth
the
Fourth Amendment, 3 the
circumstances,
t J.D. Candidate, June 2002, St. John's University School of Law.
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1995). § 1983 provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
2 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). In Graham, the Supreme Court
established a claim of excessive force during "the course of an arrest... or other
seizure" of an individual is governed by the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 395.
3 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (analyzing the use of
deadly force to effectuate an arrest under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
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Amendment, 4 or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 5 to be implicated. There exists confusion among the
federal courts regarding the proper constitutional standard to be
applied to claims of excessive force under § 1983 following the
conviction and
initial arrest
and extending through
incarceration. 6 While the Supreme Court has held that the
standard); Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1987) (applying
the Fourth Amendment to claims of excessive force by law enforcement officials);
Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying Fourth Amendment
standard to claim of excessive force arising out of an event occurring en route to the
police station). The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4 The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. While the Eighth Amendment provides protection from excessive force,
it is usually applied to individuals who have been convicted. See Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664, 671 n.40 (1977) (stating the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment was designed to protect those
convicted of crimes, and consequently "only [applies] after the State has complied
with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal
prosecutions"); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318 (1986) (finding the
Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause applicable only after
conviction); City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (applying
the Eighth Amendment only after there has been a formal adjudication of guilt).
5 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, the State shall not
"deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (applying
the Fourteenth Amendment to a claim of excessive force and establishing the
"shocks the conscience" standard of review under the Due Process Clause); Wilkins
v. May, 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process standard to claims of excessive force); Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment to claim of excessive
force and establishing five part test for review).
6 The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue and the question remains open
in several federal courts of appeal. See, e.g., Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d
1041, 1049 n.6 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating the law is unclear as to "whether a pretrial
detainee can bring a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim or even as to when an
arrestee clearly becomes a pretrial detainee"); Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 845
n.1 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "it may be questioned whether the Fourth
Amendment still controls when the seizure or arrest ripens into detention"); United
States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 788 n.7 (4th Cir. 1990) ("The Supreme Court left
unresolved in Graham whether and to what extent the protections of the Fourth
Amendment may extend to pretrial detainees."); Wisniewski v. Kennard, 901 F.2d
1276, 1277 (5th Cir. 1990) (failing to reach the issue of "whether liability should be
measured... by the standards of the [F]ourth [A]mendment or substantive due
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Fourth Amendment governs claims of excessive force during "the
course of an arrest... or other seizure" of a person,7 the Court
expressly refused to rule on how to analyze a claim of excessive
force "beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial
detention begins."8 Circuit courts are left to determine the
appropriate constitutional standard to be applied to an
individual following arrest, but prior to conviction. 9 Recently in
Wilson v. Spain,10 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held the

process" in a case alleging excessive force used after apprehending an escaped
prisoner).
7 Graham,490 U.S. at 395.
8 Id. at 395 n.10. In a footnote, the Court indicated it was not resolving the
question of whether a pretrial detainee could bring an excessive force claim under
the Fourth Amendment. See id.
9 Following Graham, there is a split of authority as to whether liability for
excessive force should be measured by the standards of the Fourth Amendment or
substantive due process. Some circuits hold a pretrial detainee's excessive force
claim is analyzed as a violation of substantive due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1161-64 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(finding plaintiffs claim of excessive force while awaiting booking was properly
analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480,
1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding "[cIlaims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or
pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause"); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Once
an individual has been arrested and is placed into custody, and surely after the
arresting officer has transferred the individual to a jail cell, the individual becomes
a pretrial detainee, protected against excessive force by the Due Process Clause.");
Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443-45 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating substantive
due process applies after that act of arrest); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 194 (7th
Cir. 1989) (stating that "if ever there were a strong case for 'substantive due
process,' it would be a case in which a person who had been arrested but not
charged or convicted was brutalized while in custody"); Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d
380, 383 (4th Cir. 1987) (utilizing the Fourteenth Amendment standard of whether
the force used "shocks the conscience" in determining whether the force used
against a pretrial detainee was excessive).
Other circuit courts have held it is the Fourth Amendment's "objective
reasonableness" standard that is to be applied to excessive force claims by pretrial
detainees. See Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
the Fourth Amendment's "objectively reasonable" standard applies to the evaluation
of an excessive force claim in the context of a custodial arrest); Powell v. Gardner,
891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding the Fourth Amendment standard
applies to the period of time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally
charged, and remains in the custody of the arresting officer); McDowell v. Rogers,
863 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding the Fourth Amendment applies to claims of
excessive force while an individual is in the custody of arresting officers); Robins v.
Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying the Fourth Amendment standard to
an excessive force claim arising out of events occurring en route to the police
station).
10 209 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2000).
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Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search
and seizure provides the appropriate standard of review for a
pretrial detainee's claim of excess force by law enforcement
officials. 1
Officer David Spain arrested Robert Wilson for public
intoxication, and another officer, Stanley Cain, escorted Wilson
to the local jail. 12 Both Spain and Cain helped book Wilson, who
was uncooperative and hostile.' 3 Wilson was permitted to call
his brother to request a ride home, but when his brother arrived,
the officers decided to keep Wilson in custody. 14 Officer Spain
placed Wilson against the wall and frisked him, but Wilson
resisted and attempted to elbow the officer. 15 Wilson was
wrestled to the floor, then handcuffed, and placed in a holding
cell. 16 While in the cell, Wilson began yelling and pounding on
the inside of the door of the cell. 17 Officer Spain unlocked the
door, pushed the door open forcefully, thereby knocking Wilson
unconscious.' 8
Wilson was taken to a hospital shortly
19
thereafter.
Wilson sued Spain under § 1983, alleging Officer Spain used
excessive force against him in violation of his constitutional
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 20 The
district court assumed there is a constitutional right to be free
from excessive force while detained by law enforcement
officials. 2 1 Finding no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Officer Spain should have known that his actions
violated Wilson's right to be free from excessive force, the district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. 22
11 See id. at 716.
12 See id. at 714.
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See id.
IsSee id.
19 See id.
20 In addition to suing Officer Spain in his individual capacity, Wilson also
named Mike Jones, the former Chief of Police of Rogers, Arkansas as an additional
defendant in his individual and official capacity. Wilson also brought a claim under
Arkansas state law. See id.
21 See id. at 715.
22 The district court had also granted summary judgment for the defendants on
the merits, with respect to Wilson's federal claims against Spain in his official
capacity and against Jones in both his individual and official capacities. See id. at
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On appeal, Judge Bowman of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals stated that while there is no question about a pretrial
detainee's right to be free from excessive force, "there is some
ongoing uncertainty about which constitutional text is the source
of that right."23 The court only briefly discussed the confusion
among the circuits regarding the appropriate standard of review
24
for claims of excessive force against pretrial detainees.
Without reconciling the split among the circuits, the court cited
earlier decisions in which the Eighth Circuit had applied Fourth
Amendment standards to excessive force claims under § 1983 by
pretrial detainees. 25
The court, in applying the Fourth
Amendment to claims of excessive force, relied on case law that
focused on an extension of the reasonableness standard of the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and
seizure beyond the actual act of arrest. 26 The Wilson court
determined the Fourth Amendment standard strikes the most
appropriate balance between the rights of the pretrial detainee
and the governmental interest in maintaining order. 27
Utilizing the "objective reasonableness" standard of the
Fourth Amendment, the court found the officer was entitled to
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and on
the merits of the claim because his actions were objectively
reasonable. 28 The court stated, "ITihe 'reasonableness' of a
715. "With all of the federal claims gone, the [d]istrict [clourt declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Wilson's state-law claims,.., a decision that Wilson
[did] not challenge [on appeal], and dismissed the complaint." Id.
2 Id. at 716.
24 See id.
25 See id; see also Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. 1998) (applying the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard to claims of excessive force by law
enforcement officials during the booking process); Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d
1226 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Fourth Amendment standards not only to the act of
arrest, but also to force used against an individual restrained in the back of a police
car).
26 In Moore, the eighth circuit applied Fourth Amendment standards when law
enforcement officers at a jail used force against a violent and disruptive arrestee
during the booking process. See Moore, 146 F.3d at 535. Similarly, in Mayard, the
court applied Fourth Amendment standards to the use of force against an arrestee
who was restrained in the back of a police car. See Mayard, 105 F.3d at 1228.
27 Wilson, 209 F.3d at 716. The previous case law that applies the Fourth
Amendment beyond the instant of the initial seizure did not provide extensive
analysis on the difference between an arrestee and a pretrial detainee and instead
assumed that the arrest continued beyond the actual arrest. See Moore, 146 F.3d at
535-36; Mayard, 105 F.3d at 1228.
28 The court stated, "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be
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particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the [benefit] of
hindsight."29 Finding that officers are often called upon to make
split-second decisions, 30 the court was asked to determine
whether Office Spain's use of force to quiet a prisoner who had
been "very difficult to manage" 31 was lawful. The court found
that while Officer Spain might have known that if he pushed the
door open quickly, it might make contact with Wilson, a
reasonable jury could not find the manner in which the door was
32
opened objectively unreasonable.
While the court determined it is the Fourth Amendment
standard that strikes the most appropriate balance between the
rights of the pretrial detainee and the governmental interest in
maintaining order, 33 none of the existing case law and analysis
clearly fits the situation of the pretrial detainees. The Supreme
Court must make clear that while substantive due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment may play a role in deciding
excessive force cases, for most citizens, the reasonableness
standard of the Fourth Amendment, informed by existing human
rights norms, provides the primary source of constitutional
34
protection from excessive force.
Part I of this Comment outlines claims of excessive force by
law enforcement officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Part II of this
Comment tracks the development of the constitutional standards
applying the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and
the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search
and seizure to excessive force claims in the course of an arrest,
culminating with a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene...." Wilson, 209
F.3d at 716. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). "Officer Spain
testified that he needed to re-enter the cell to quiet Wilson and to ensure that
Wilson was not injuring himself." Id. at 717. The court reasoned that "while Spain
might have known that the door could make contact with Wilson, a reasonable jury
could not conclude" that the officer's actions were "objectively unreasonable in the
circumstances." Id.
29 Id. at 716.
30 See id. at 716-17.
31 Id. at 717.
32 See id.
3 See id. at 716.
34 See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Comment, Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987
DUKE L.J. 692, 693 (advocating for the application of the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard to claims of excessive force during the course of an arrest).
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Graham v. Connor.35 Part III of this Comment asserts there
exists a continuum of constitutional rights applicable to all
individuals, regardless of their status as arrestees, pretrial
detainees, or convicted inmates, arguing there can be no logical
distinction between arrestees and pretrial detainees and
asserting a single constitutional standard applies to claims of
excessive force.
Part III also examines the traditional
arguments for and against extending the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable search and seizure beyond the
initial arrest. Part IV of this Comment submits that while both
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect an individual's
bodily integrity against the use of unreasonable force, it is the
less burdensome Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" standard
that must control claims of excessive force by law enforcement
officials against pretrial detainees. Part V of this Comment
provides a brief discussion of excessive force by law enforcement
officials in the context of existing international human rights
treaties and asserts that there are certain fundamental human
rights under all conditions-from arrest, through and including
incarceration.
I. EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS UNDER § 1983
Law enforcement plays a vital role in contemporary
American society36 and police officers possess incredible
powers. 37 Law enforcement officials are permitted only a small
margin of error in judgment in situations that impose a high
degree of physical and mental stress. 38 In addition to enforcing
the law, pursuing violators, and providing security for the public,
police officers shoulder the principal "responsibility for
protecting people's fundamental civil rights to life, liberty, and
property."39
Law enforcement's "general responsibility to
35 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
36 See Matthew V. Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal
Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV 149 (outlining existing legal
remedies for police misconduct and suggesting alternatives).
37 See U.S. COMMN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WHO

REPORT ON POLICE PRACTICES V (1981)

Is GUARDING

THE GUARDIANS?: A

[hereinafter WHO IS GUARDING THE

GUARDIANS?].
38

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).

39 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLICE PRACTICES AND THE PRESERVATION

OF CIVIL RIGHTS: A STATEMENT OF THE U.S. COM1V'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS 1 (1980); see
also Hess, supranote 36.
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preserve the peace and enforce the law carries with it the
[qualified] power to arrest and to use force."40 Careful scrutiny
of these actions is necessary, as police officers exercise this
power with wide discretion, minimal supervision, and without
opportunity for reflection in stressful and often dangerous
41
circumstances.
Events over the last decade have subjected law enforcement
officers across the nation to intense scrutiny and raised serious
questions regarding the extent of the qualified privilege granted
to law enforcement officers. 42 The war on crime and drugs has
prompted, what some commentators have called, a "win-at-allcosts approach" to law enforcement, where the rights of the
individual are second to the pursuit and capture of alleged
criminals. 43 Some commentators have even asserted that police
abuses have been "unofficially tolerated as the price we pay for
maintaining law and order."44 Such tolerance is unacceptable.
There must be a distinction made between the force necessary to
maintain order and enforce the law and the use of excessive force
that violates an individual's constitutional and fundamental
human rights.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a statutory remedy for state
action resulting in the deprivation of civil rights. 45 "Enacted as
40 WHO IS GUARDING THE GUARDIANS, supra note 37, at V; see also WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.10, at 470 (2d ed. 1986). The

right of law enforcement officials to utilize force under certain circumstances in
order "to protect the interests of society" has been recognized by the Supreme Court.
See Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 1987).
41 See MICHAEL AVERY, ET. AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION §
2:14, at 2-23 (3d ed. 1996); Hess, supra note 36, at 151. Exceeding the amount of
force required by the particular circumstance may subject the arresting officer to
civil or criminal liability. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(1) (McKinney 1998).
42 See, e.g., Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, And an Unarmed
Man Is Killed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at Al (discussing confrontation between
officers in the New York City Police Department and Amadou Diallo); David
Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him in Custody, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at B1 (discussing allegations of police brutality made by
Abner Louima against officers in the New York City Police Department); Alex
Prud'homme, Police Brutality: Four Los Angeles Officers are Arrested for a Vicious
Beating, and the Country Plunges into a Debate on the Rise of Complaints Against
Cops, TIME, March 25, 1991, at 16 (discussing the beating of Rodney King by law
enforcement officers in Los Angeles).
43 Hess, supra note 36, at 149.
44 Darlene Ricker, Behind the Silence: Does Society Condone Police Brutality in
Exchange for Getting Criminals off the Streets?, A.B.A. J., July 1991, at 45.
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, [§ 1983 was designed to
provide a remedy for the widespread civil rights violations that
characterized the Reconstruction period in the [post-Civil War]
South."46 "Originally called the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, [§1
1983 was designed to provide a measure of federal control over
state officials who showed reluctance to enforce state laws
protecting newly freed slaves and union sympathizers." 47 The
statute established a federal cause of action, providing a neutral
federal forum for plaintiffs seeking relief against state officials
who deprived them of their civil rights. 48 Though the statute
stems from Reconstruction era civil rights legislation, it became
commonly used for claims of excessive force following the
landmark case of Monell v. Department of Social Services of the
City of New York, 4 9 which assigned liability to local governments
for constitutional violations resulting from policies or customs. 50
42 U.S.C. § 1983 has become the primary vehicle for
vindicating civil rights deprivations committed through the use
of excessive force by law enforcement officials. 51 In order to seek
the remedial relief provided by § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a
deprivation of rights or privileges secured by the Constitution or
the laws of the United States. 52 In examining claims of excessive
46 WHO is GUARDING THE GUARDIANS?, supranote 37, at 130.
47 E. Bryan MacDonald, Graham v. Connor: A Reasonable Approach to

Excessive Force Claims Against Police Officers, 22 PAC. L.J. 157, 162 (1990).
48 See id; see also AVERY, supra note 41, § 2:14, at 2-23 (commenting that a
claim of excessive force by a law enforcement or other state official constitutes a
cause of action under § 1983). The legislative history of § 1983 has been outlined in
a number of cases. See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 502-08 (1982);
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42 (1972); McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S.
668, 671-72 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-83 (1961).
1983 actions are intended to fulfill at least two basic purposes in the police
abuse context. First, such actions are designed to compensate victims of
police abuse, usually through an award of compensatory damages. Second,
such actions are intended to make police officers and departments
accountable to [certain] constitutionally required standards of conduct.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 119 (1998).

49 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
50 See id. at 694-95.
51 See AVERY, supra note 41, § 2:14, at 2-23; see also Davidson v. O'Lone, 752
F.2d 817, 827 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating § 1983 functions as the "primary vehicle to
provide redress for unconstitutional action by state employees that violates the
[C]onstitution7).
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). § 1983 provides in part that "[elvery person who,
under color of any statute.., of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects ... any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights,
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force by law enforcement officials, courts have applied the
Fourth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, or the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, depending upon the
53
particular circumstances.
There is no generic standard for the review of excessive force
claims brought under § 1983. 54 The Supreme Court has clearly
rejected the idea that there is a general "right" to be free from
excessive force grounded in "basic principles of § 1983
jurisdiction."55 "[§1 1983 does not confer substantive rights but
merely provides a means to vindicate rights conferred by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States."56 In examining
an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, the Supreme
Court dictates the "analysis begins by identifying the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged
application of force."57 It is the constitutional right infringed
upon that determines the standard under which the court must
analyze the § 1983 claim.58
Determining the proper
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitutionand laws, shall be liable to the
party injured ..... Id. (emphasis added); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
140 (1979) ("The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit... is whether the plaintiff has been
deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and laws.' ").
53 See supra notes 3-5.
54 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 387, 393 (1989) (rejecting the '"notion that
all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic
standard"); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-26 (1986) (analyzing a claim of
excessive force used to subdue convicted prisoner under the Eight Amendment
standard); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-22 (1985) (analyzing claim of
excessive force used to effect arrest under the Fourth Amendment standard); Baker,
443 U.S. at 144 n.3 (stating § 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights," but
merely provides "a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred").
55 Graham, 490 US. at 393 (" There are ... certain basic principles in [§] 1983
jurisprudence as it relates to claims of excessive force that are beyond question[,]
[wihether the factual circumstances involve an arrestee, a pretrial detainee, or a
prisoner' ") (quoting Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382 (4th Cir. 1987)).
56 Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000); see also Graham, 490 U.S.
at 393-94; Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir. 1973) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) ("It is by now axiomatic that, in order to recover damages in an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claimant must show a deprivation of rights protected by
the Constitution.") (citing Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 520 (2d Cir. 1973)).
57 Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. In Graham, the Supreme Court established that a
claim of excessive force during the course of an arrest or other seizure of an
individual is governed by the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 395.
58 See Reginald R. White III, Recent Development, Brothers v. Klevenhagen:
The Fifth Circuit Gives Its Imprimatur to the Indiscriminate Use of Deadly Force
Against Escaping PretrialDetainees, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1051, 1052-53 (1995); see also
Graham, 490 U.S. at 393 (rejecting the "notion that all excessive force claims
brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard"); Baker, 443 U.S.
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constitutional standard under which to review claims of
excessive force under § 1983 is complicated by the fact that the
circuit courts have differentiated an individual's rights at
59
various stages of the arrest process.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS APPLIED TO EXCESSIVE FORCE

CLAIMS
A. A Look at Arrest
The confusion surrounding the proper constitutional
standard covering pretrial detainees once clouded the debate
over the proper standard to govern claims of excessive force in
the course of an arrest or seizure.60 The Supreme Court in
Graham v. Connor6 ' ended the debate over whether the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard or the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause governed such claims during an
arrest and applied the Fourth Amendment standard. 62 While
the Supreme Court in Graham refused to rule on the proper
constitutional standard governing pretrial detainees, 63 an
overview of the case law leading up to the Graham decision
outlines the standards utilized by courts to review claims of
excessive force by law enforcement officers under § 1983.
1.

The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides no
State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

at 140 (1979) (stating that "[tlhe first inquiry in any § 1983 suit is whether the
plaintiff has been deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and laws' ").
59 The case law refers to classifications of the actual arrest or seizure, the
pretrial detention period, and the post-conviction incarceration. See supra note 6;
see also Graham, 390 U.S. at 395 n.10; Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 190 (5th
Cir. 1971) (stating an individual's constitutional rights change from pretrial
detention to post-conviction incarceration); Mark S. Bruder, Comment, When Police
Use Excessive Force: Choosing a Constitutional Threshold of Liability in Justice v.
Dennis, 62 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 735, 742-44 (1988) (distinguishing among arrestees,
pretrial detainees, and prisoners); Bradley M. Campbell, Comment, Excessive Force
Claims: Removing the Double Standard, 53 U. CHI. L. REV 1369, 1387-88 (1986)
(discussing how constitutional protections change from the initial arrest to the
pretrial detention period).
60 See infra notes 61-100 and accompanying text.
61 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
62 See id. at 394-95.
63 See id. at 395 n.10.
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without due process of law... "64 Due process of law is a
summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those
personal immunities that are "so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," 65 or
are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."66 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that "the touchstone of due
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government." 67 The Due Process Clause protects individuals
from the denial of fundamental procedural fairness, 68 and the
exercise of power by the state without a legitimate government
objective. 69 The application of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause to claims of excessive force by law enforcement
officials originates with the Supreme Court decision in Rochin v.
70
California.
In Rochin, the Court set forth the "shocks the conscience"
standard utilized to review claims of excessive force under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 71 In Rochin, the Court vacated a state
criminal conviction as a violation of the Due Process Clause of

64 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. The term "due process of law" refers to the law
of the land in each -state exerted within the limits of fundamental principles of
liberty and justice. 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 7 (2000).
65 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
66 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
67 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (quoting Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
68 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (finding the procedural
Due Process Clause protects against "arbitrary taking[s]").
69 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (stating the
substantive due process guarantee protects against government power arbitrarily
and oppressively exercised). "Unlike procedural due process claims, which challenge
the adequacy of the procedures used by the government in deciding how to treat
individuals, substantive due process claims allege that certain governmental
conduct would remain unjustified even ifit were accompanied by the most stringent
of procedural safeguards." Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1500 (1985).
70 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin, the Supreme Court reversed Rochin's
conviction for possession of pills containing morphine. See id. at 174. Police officers,
acting on a tip that Rochin was selling drugs, entered his home through an open
door, forced their way into Rochin's room, and jumped on him when they observed
him swallowing pills the officers believed to be morphine. See id. at 166. Unable to
retrieve the pills, the police took Rochin to the hospital where a doctor, at an
officer's direction, forced a solution into Rochin's stomach to induce vomiting. See id.
Although the vomiting did produce two pills containing morphine, the Court held
the conviction was obtained by methods offensive to the Due Process Clause. See id.
at 174; see also MacDonald, supra note 47 at 165-66. (discussing Rochin's excessive
force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment "shocks the conscience" standard).
71 See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-73.
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the Fourteenth Amendment when the evidence was obtained by
forcing the defendant to vomit.72 The Court held substantive due
process prohibits convictions that are obtained by methods that
offend a sense of justice 73 and recognized an individual's right to
be free from official conduct that "shock[ed] the conscience" of
the Court.74 Applying the principles of due process, 75 the Court
held the manner the evidence used to convict Rochin was
obtained does "more than offend some fastidious squeamishness
too
or private sentimentalism about combatting crime
76
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience."
It was the decision of the Supreme Court in Rochin that led
to the application of the substantive due process standard to
claims of pretrial detainees of the use of excessive force by law
enforcement officials. 77 In Johnson v. Glick,78 the plaintiff
claimed he had been assaulted by an officer while being held in
the Manhattan House of Detention for Men prior to his trial on
felony charges. 79 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
Johnson relied upon Rochin for the proposition that "apart from
any 'specific' of the Bill of Rights, application of undue force by
law enforcement officers deprives a suspect of liberty without
due process of law."8 0 In determining whether there has been a
violation of an individual's substantive due process rights
actionable under § 1983, the test set forth in Johnson requires a
court to examine: (1) the need for the application of force; (2) the
relationship between the need to apply force and the amount of
See id. at 173-74.
See id. at 173.
74 Id. at 172.
75 The Supreme Court stated in Rochin,
[Tihe requirements of the Due Process Clause 'inescapably imposes upon
this Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of proceedings
[resulting in a conviction] in order to ascertain whether they offend those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of
English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most
heinous offenses.'
Id. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)).
76 Id. at 172.
77 See MacDonald, supra note 47, at 166-67 (following the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment "shocks the conscience standard from Rochin through the
inception of the four-part Johnson test set forth to determine whether the use of
force by state law enforcement "shocks the conscience" of the court).
78 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
79 See id. at 1029-30.
80 Id. at 1032.
72
73
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force used; (3) the severity of the injury inflicted; and (4) whether
force was applied "in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm."8 1
The federal circuit courts have almost
unanimously adopted the Johnson substantive due process test
or a variation of it when analyzing claims of excessive force by
pretrial detainees, and extended its application to excessive force
82
claims arising out of arrests.
2.

The Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the
people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.. "83 "The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness [,]"84 which is "measured in
objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances."8 5
The Fourth Amendment "reasonableness inquiry.., is whether
the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the
facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to
their underlying intent or motivation."8 6 "The 'reasonableness' of
a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a

81 Id. at 1033.
82 See MacDonald, supra note

47, at 167-68; see, e.g., Dale v. Janklow, 828 F.2d
481, 487 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding no substantive due process violation in subduing
arrestee by hitting him over the head with a catsup bottle when suspect was armed
and made numerous threats); Byrd v. Clark, 783 F.2d 1002, 1008 (11th Cir. 1986)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment where there was evidence
arrestee suffered injury that required surgery to repair); Rutherford v. City of
Berkley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding plaintiff stated a claim where
there was allegations of unprovoked police assault, including kicking suspect while
in custody); Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1404 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding no
cause of action where the claimant suffered no physical injury). Some circuits
adopted a three-part test in analyzing excessive force claims that very closely
mirrors the Johnson test. See, e.g., Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987)
(adopting the three requirements of Johnson); Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263
(5th Cir. 1981) (adopting the three-part test); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.
1980) (evaluating a student's claim of corporal punishment under three-part test);
see also Campbell, supra note 59, at 1369, 1376.
83

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

84

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).

85 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497

U.S. 177, 183-85 (1990) (stating the Fourth Amendment proscribes only those stateinitiated searches and seizures that are unreasonable); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard to
claims of unreasonable intrusion upon individual's right to privacy).
86 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989).
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"The calculus...
reasonable officer on the scene."8 7
must... allow [ for the fact that police officers are often forced to
the amount of force that is
make split-second decisions.., about
88
necessary in a particular situation."
The Fourth Amendment approach began to gain acceptance
89
when, in 1985, the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner,
directly faced a claim of excessive force during an arrest brought
under § 1983.90 In Garner, a father brought a wrongful death
action under § 1983 after his son, who was fleeing the scene of a
burglary, was shot to death by a police officer. 91 The officer was
authorized to use deadly force against a fleeing suspect under
both Tennessee statutory law and Memphis Police Department
policy.92 Rather than apply the substantive due process test, the
Court concluded that the apprehension of a suspect by the use of
deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness
93
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
The Garner Court asserted that when evaluating the
constitutionality of a seizure, courts " 'must balance the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
against the importance of the
Amendment interests
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.' "94 The
Court stated the inquiry must be "whether the totality of the
87

Id. at 396.

88 Id. at 396-97. Factors that have been taken into account in determining the

reasonableness of an officer's conduct include "the severity of the crime, whether the
suspect posed a threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether the
suspect was resisting arrest." Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1998)
(addressing a claim of excessive force by law enforcement officers during the
booking process) (quoting Foster v. Metro. Airports Comm'n, 914 F.2d 1076, 1081
(8th Cir. 1990) (addressing claim of excessive force by law enforcement officers in
making arrest)). The officer's subjective intentions are irrelevant-a pure heart will
not make unreasonable acts constitutional nor will malice turn a reasonable act into
a violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Graham,490 U.S. at 397.
89 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
90 See generally MacDonald, supra note 47, at 169-72 (discussing the
significance of the Garnerdecision).
91 See Garner,471 U.S. at 3-5.
92 See id. at 4. The Tennessee statute provided that "[if after notice of the
intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee[s] or forcibly resist[s], the officer
may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest." See id. at 4 (quoting TENN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982)). The department policy, although slightly more
restrictive than the statute, still permitted the use of deadly force in cases of
burglary. See id. at 5.
93 See id. at 7.
94 See id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
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circumstances justified a particular sort of search or seizure."9 5
The Court balanced the intrusiveness of the deadly force used
against the
"governmental interest in effective
law
enforcement[,J" 96 and was not convinced that "use of deadly force
is a sufficiently productive means of accomplishing [law
97
enforcement goals] to justify the killing of nonviolent suspects."
The opinion by the Supreme Court mentioned neither
substantive due process nor the Johnson test,98 even though the
lower court had found the Tennessee statute unconstitutional on
both Fourth Amendment and due process grounds. 99
After Garner,the federal appellate courts continued to apply
the Johnson test, and only the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected
the continued application of the Johnson substantive due process
standard. 10 0 In Lester v. City of Chicago,1°1 the Seventh Circuit
found the district court erred in applying the "substantive due
process" standard in a claim arising from the use of force during
an arrest, 10 2 and found "the only correct way to deal with
plaintiffs excessive force claim was through the application of
the objective Fourth Amendment standards articulated by the
Supreme Court in Garner."10 3 This view is consistent with that
articulated by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor.104
95 Id. at 8-9.
96 Id. at 9.
97 Id. at 10.
98 See Freyermuth, supra note 34, at 693.
99 See Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 241 (6th Cir. 1983)

(holding that the 'Tennessee statute [is] unconstitutional because it authorizes
severe and excessive, and therefore unreasonable, methods of seizure of the person
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments").
100 See Michael C. Fayz, Comment, Graham v. Connor: The Supreme Court
Clears the Way for Summary Dismissal of Section 1983 Excessive Force Claims, 36
WAYNE L. REV. 1507, 1513 (1990).
101 830 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1987).
102 See id. at 713-14.
103 S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF
SECTION 1983 151 n.160 (1989 Supp.); see also Fayz, supra note 100, at 1513;
Freyermuth, supra note 34, at 693. In Lester, a woman arrested for disorderly

conduct at a police station alleged excessive force had been used to arrest her. See
Lester, 830 F.2d at 707. The Seventh Circuit held all excessive force claims during
the course of an arrest should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment standard

and not the substantive due process standard. See id. at 710. Reviewing the
Supreme Court's holding in Garner,the court stated although the issue addressed
in Garner was the use of deadly force, "implicit in its totality of circumstances

approach is that police use of less than deadly force would violate the Fourth
Amendment if not justified under the circumstances." Id. at 711.
104 490 U.S. 386 (1989). In Graham, the plaintiff sued five individual officers
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In Graham, the Supreme Court found claims of excessive
force against law enforcement officials "in the course of an
arrest, investigatory stop or other 'seizure' of a free citizen,"
must be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. 10 5 The Court
thus eliminated the substantive due process test as a standard of
review for such claims and held the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard is the exclusive standard by which
courts should evaluate excessive force claims. 10 6 The Court also
stated excessive force claims by convicted prisoners should be
analyzed under the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
10 7
and unusual punishment.
3.

The Eighth Amendment

The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment is applicable after conviction and sentencing, 08 and
provides the substantive protection against violation of
prisoners' constitutional rights. 10 9 In Whitley v. Albers,110 the
Supreme Court stated, "[T]he Eighth Amendment, which is
specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary
source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in
cases... where the deliberate use of force is challenged as
excessive and unjustified.""'
Again in Graham v. Connor, the Court stated, "[T]he less
protective Eighth Amendment standard applies 'only after the
State has complied with the constitutional guarantees
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions.'"112 The
Court went on to state that the Eighth Amendment analysis for

and the City of Charlotte, North Carolina under § 1983, alleging a deprivation of his
constitutional right to be free from excessive force under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 387-88.
105 Id. at 395.

108 Federal courts, when addressing a claim that police used excessive force in
making an arrest had applied a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process

test, a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard, or a combination of the two, to
assess the constitutionality of the police officers' conduct.
107 See id. at 398-99 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977)).
108 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 392 n.6.
109 See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).

110 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
111 Id. at 327.
112 Graham, 490 U.S. at 398 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671
n.40 (1977)).
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excessive force would still consider "'whether the force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically... [to cause] harm.' "113 Although
the Supreme Court has clearly defined when the protection of
the Eighth Amendment begins, 114 the Court has not articulated
115
where that protection ends.
III. FILLING THE GAP "BEYOND THE POINT AT WHICH ARREST
116
ENDS AND PRETRIAL DETENTION BEGINS"
While Graham established that the Fourth Amendment is
the proper standard to apply in cases of excessive force in the
course of an arrest, confusion still exists as to whether the
Fourth Amendment standard continues to apply following arrest
and during pretrial detention. The Supreme Court's decision in
Graham left unanswered the question of whether the Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process test or the Fourth
Amendment "objective reasonableness" test is the proper
standard for evaluating excessive force claims made by pretrial
detainees." 7 In a footnote in Graham, the Supreme Court
specifically stated it was leaving open the question of whether
the Fourth Amendment continues to provide protection against
the use of excessive force by law enforcement officials "beyond
11
the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention begins."
As outlined by the Eighth Circuit in Wilson v. Spain,119
there is considerable disagreement among the federal circuits on
113

Id. at 398 n.11.

See id. at 392 n.6 (stating that "Eighth Amendment's protections [do] not
attach until after conviction and sentence"); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
535 n.16 (1979); Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 671 n.40.
115 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10; see also White, supra note 58, at 1055.
The standard of review under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as established by the Supreme Court in Rochin v. California,342 U.S.
165 (1952), refers to conduct that "shocks the conscience." Id. at 172. The Court
stated the standard requires an evaluation based on "disinterested inquiry pursued
in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the
detached consideration of conflicting claims... [and] ... duly mindful of reconciling
the needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive society." Id. (citations
omitted). The Court went further and stated that judges may not draw on "merely
personal and private notions and [wrongfully] disregard the limits that bind judges
in their judicial function." Id. at 170.
114

116 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.
117

See id. at 395.

118

Id. at 395 n.10.
209 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2000).

119
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this issue. 120 The Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have
applied the Fourth Amendment "objective reasonableness"
standard to claims of excessive force occurring after the initial
arrest.' 2 1 The Ninth Circuit, in Robins v. Harum,122 endorsed
the idea of continuing seizure-finding that a seizure continues
between the arrest and the formal charging of a suspect and
police conduct during this period is subject to the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard. 123 The Fourth, Fifth,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have refused to extend the
protection of the Fourth Amendment beyond the initial act of
arrest to pretrial detainees in custody, and instead apply the
substantive due process standard of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 124 For example, in Wilkins v. May, 125 the Seventh
Circuit stated that a strong case for the application of
"substantive due process,... would be a case in which a person
who had been arrested but not charged or convicted was
126
brutalized while in custody."
120 See id. at 715-16.
1, See Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
the Fourth Amendment's "objectively reasonable" standard applies to the evaluation
of an excessive force claim in the context of a custodial arrest); Powell v. Gardner,
891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding the Fourth Amendment standard
applies to the period of time when the person arrested is arraigned or formally
charged, and remains in the custody of the arresting officer); McDowell v. Rogers,
863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding the Fourth Amendment applies to
claims of excessive force while individual is in the custody of arresting officers);
Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying the Fourth
Amendment standard to excessive force claim arising out of events occurring en
route to the police station).
122 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985).
123 See id- at 1009-10.
124 See Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1161-64 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(finding plaintiffs claim of excessive force while awaiting booking was properly
analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480,
1490 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding "[cilaims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or
pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendments Due
Process Clause"); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Once
an individual ... is placed into police custody, and surely after the arresting officer
has transferred the individual to a jail cell, the individual becomes a pretrial
detainee, protected against excessive force by the Due Process Clause."); Valencia v.
Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443-45 (5th Cir. 1993) (taking the position that
substantive due process applies after that act of arrest); Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d
380, 383 (4th Cir. 1987) (utilizing the Fourteenth Amendment standard of "shocks
the conscience" in determining whether the force used against a pretrial detainee
was excessive).
125 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989).
126 Id. at 193-95.
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The "Not-So BrightLine" Between Arrest and Pretrial
Detention

A.

A pretrial detainee has been defined as "one lawfully
1 27
arrested and being held prior to a formal adjudication of guilt."
Courts and commentators refer to this period of pretrial
detention, following arrest but prior to conviction and
sentencing, as a "legal twilight zone."128 The fact that there is no
clear defining point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention
begins has created considerable confusion in the federal
129

courts.

The Fifth Circuit, unlike the Supreme Court, has attempted
draw
a clear line between arrest and the pretrial detention
to
period. In Valencia v. Wiggins,130 the Fifth Circuit considered
the appropriate constitutional standard to be applied to the
plaintiffs claim of excessive force during the third week of his
pretrial detention. 131 The Valencia court determined pretrial
127 United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 788 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding an
individual escorted by arresting officers to a "holding area" or "booking room" was a
pretrial detainee); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (stating a person
lawfully committed to pretrial detention has not been adjudged guilty of any crime);
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (stating a pretrial detainee has had only
a determination of "probable cause as a prerequisite to [the] extended restraint of
[his] liberty following arrest"); Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 865-66 (4th Cir.
1988) (defining a pretrial detainee as one who is lawfully detained prior to trial);
Padraic P. Lyndon, Escape:A Deadly Proposition?Prisonersand PretrialDetainees,
21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 203, 219 (1995) (defining a pretrial
detainee as one who has been arrested but not convicted).
128 Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000). Various courts and
commentators have utilized similar phrases to describe the pretrial detention
period. See Lyndon, supra note 127, at 219 (referring to the "gray area between
arrest and conviction"); White, supra note 58, at 1055, 1059 (referring to the
existence of pretrial detainees in "constitutional limbo" and to the "mongrel nature
of pretrial detainees") (citations omitted).
129 See Wilson v. Williams, 83 F.3d 870, 874 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Wilson's
disagreements with the trial court's instruction are not surprising given the paucity
and ambiguity of case law regarding the standards applicable to a pretrial
detainee's § 1983 claim of excessive force and the trial court's struggle to
accommodate the different theories of the parties at trial.").
130981 F.2d 1440 (1993).

131 See Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1442. Valencia was arrested on drug charges and
detained in the Brewster County (Texas) Jail. See id. "One evening, three weeks
into his pretrial detention, Valencia took part in a jail disturbance in which the
inmates made excessive noise and threw objects out of cells." Id. Following a similar
disturbance the following night, Valencia claimed he was singled out from the other
inmates and subjected to excessive force-he was put in a choke hold that made him
lose consciousness and forced into a drunk tank where he was struck by officers
several times while handcuffed and on his knees. See id.

20011

§ 1983 CLAIMS FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE

469

detention does not begin until "after the incidents of arrest are
completed, after the plaintiff has been released from the
arresting officer's custody, and after the plaintiff has been in
detention awaiting trial for a significant period of time."132 The
court limited Fourth Amendment protection to individuals who,
though arrested, had not yet been subject to institutional
security. 33 The Valencia court found that after an individual
had been in detention "for a significant period of time[J "134 the
Fourth Amendment no longer provided "an appropriate
constitutional basis for protecting against deliberate official uses
35
of force."'1
The Valencia court did not provide guidance as to what
constituted a "significant period of time.' 36 While the court
found an individual to be a pretrial detainee after three weeks,
other courts that have followed the Valencia framework found
plaintiffs to be pretrial detainees after shorter time periods. For
example, in Rankin v. Klenvenhagen,13 7 the court found an
individual to be a pretrial detainee after two weeks. 138 Further,
in Bender v. Brumley, 3 9 the court found the plaintiff became a
pretrial detainee in less than a day.140 A number of circuits have
extended the Fourth Amendment protection to the period
between arrest and charge, 4 1 or through the period in which the
arrestee remains in the arresting officer's custody, 42 or to the
132 Id. at 1443-44.
133 See id. at 1444-45.
134 Id. at 1444.
135Id. at 1443.
136 Id. at 1444. The Fifth Circuit only stated that the three-week period at issue
in Valencia constituted an "attenuated stage of pretrial detention" and consequently
the Fourth Amendment would not continue to protect against wrongful uses of force.
Id. at 1444.
137 5 F.3d 103 (5th Cir. 1993).

13 See id. at 106.
139 1 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1993).
140 See id. at 273.

141 See Valencia, 981 F.2d at 1444; see also Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155,
1162 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness
standard applies post-arrest up to the arrested suspect's first judicial hearing);
Hammer v. Gross, 884 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated en banc on other

grounds, 932 F.2d 842 (1991) (finding the Fourth Amendment applies to force used
to compel drunk driving arrestee to consent to chemical tests because the force
constituted search incident to arrest).
142 See Hammer, 884 F.2d at 1204; see also Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039,
1044 (2d. Cir. 1989) ("[The Fourth Amendment standard probably should be
applied at least to the period prior to the time when the person arrested is
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end of the booking process. 143 Such cases prove it is difficult to
draw a clear distinction between an arrestee and a pretrial
detainee for the purposes of differentiating rights belonging to
each. 144 Even in an attempt to draw such a line, Valencia comes
up short. It is impossible to demarcate in each individual set of
circumstances where arrest ends and pretrial detention begins
without subjecting individuals to the arbitrary application of
constitutional standards.
While some courts have distinguished between the various
stages of arrest, pretrial detention and post-conviction
incarceration, 145 other courts have referred to the "constitutional
continuum" that runs through initial arrest or seizure, postarrest or pretrial detention, and post-conviction incarceration. 146
It is this constitutional continuum that should dictate the proper
constitutional standard that governs claims of the use of
excessive force by law enforcement officials. "The constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable interference by police officers
is incontrovertible."1 4 7
"The Constitution has long been
interpreted to embrace security from 'arbitrary intrusion by
police.'"148 "The interest of persons in the integrity of their
bodies is a liberty interest of high order .... The order of this
arraigned or formally charged, and remains in the custody... of the arresting
officers."); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating Fourth
Amendment seizure "continues throughout the time the person remains in the
custody of the arresting officer"); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir.
1985) (stating that "once a seizure has occurred, it continues throughout the time
the arrestee is in the custody of the arresting officers").
143 See Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) (assuming the
arrestee's 'presence in the jail and the completion of the booking process marked
the line between 'arrest' and 'detention' ").
144 See Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1164 (4th Cir. 1997) ("If the arresting
officer quickly transferred custody of the arrestee to a back-up officer, he could bring
Fourth Amendment protection to an abrupt end.").
145 See supra note 59.
146 Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding the
constitutionality of law enforcement officers' entire course of conduct is to be
evaluated under the Fourth Amendment). Efforts to draw a clear line between
arrest and pretrial detention have not proven successful, nor has their been any
definitive justification for requiring pretrial detainees to overcome the higher
"shocks the conscience" standard while individuals out on bail would have only have
to overcome the Fourth Amendment standard.
147 Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1970).
148 See id. (citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1948)). In Wolf, the
Supreme Court stated, "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by
the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society." Wolf, 338 U.S. at 28.
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liberty interest is precisely as high among persons accused of
crime as among persons unaccused of crime."149 It is clear that a
single standard should be applicable in all types of excessive
force cases--"regardless of the plaintiffs status or the
circumstances surrounding the use of force." 150
B.

Weighing the Options: The Application of the Fourthand
FourteenthAmendments Beyond Arrest

If a single constitutional standard is to apply throughout
arrest and pretrial detention, it becomes necessary to weigh the
arguments for applying either the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard or the Fourteenth Amendment "shocks
the conscience" standard under substantive due process.
C. ParticularizedRights Under the Constitution-The Fourth
and EighthAmendments
Some commentators have criticized the Fourteenth
Amendment standard, stating substantive due process has
become "shorthand for a judicial privilege to condemn things the
judges do not like or cannot understand."' 51 Furthermore, the
"shocks the conscience" test is a "vague standard... inviting
decisionmakers to consult their sensibilities rather than
objective circumstances.' 52 The Fourth Amendment standard of
objectivity is also subject to the assignment of values by the
court to the respective interests of the governmental interest in
the level of force employed and the intrusion on the individual's
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure. 153 Clearly, in applying either the Fourth Amendment or
the Fourteenth Amendment, judges are permitted neither to
ignore the facts surrounding the particular case nor abandon
judicial responsibility for their own personal notions of justice. 154
149 Norris v. Dist. of Columbia, 737 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (U.S. App. D.C. 1984)

(Doyle, J., concurring).

150 Freyermuth, supra note 34, at 696.
151 Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1406 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
152 Id. at 1407.
153 See Campbell, supra note 59, at 1386; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386 (1989); Belly. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
15 See Campbell, supra note 59, at 1386 (stating the Fourth Amendments
objectivity is subject to attack and requires the assignment of values to the interests
of individual liberty and governmental need in applying the standard).
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While issues of vagueness plague both standards, it is
important to note the Supreme Court places little weight on
claims of violations of due process when they are better
addressed under a particularized right guaranteed under the Bill
of Rights. 155 The Supreme Court has made clear the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures and the
Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual
punishment are the two principal sources of constitutional
6
protection against excessive force by law enforcement officials.,
Graham v. Connor requires a constitutional claim covered by a
specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth
Amendment, must be analyzed "under the standard appropriate
to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due
process." 57 Of these two principal sources of constitutional
protection, it is the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
standard that arguably applies to claims of pretrial detainees, as
the Eighth Amendment's protection does not attach until after
58
conviction.
155 For a discussion of this trend, see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326
(1986), where the Court stated that while there may be some overlap between the
protections provided under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Eighth
Amendment "which is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.., serves as the primary source of substantive protection to
convicted prisoners."; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (stating
the Fourth and Eighth Amendments are the two primary sources of protection
against physically abusive government conduct).
156 See Graham,490 U.S. at 395. The Supreme Court stated a claim of excessive
force in the course of a "seizure" should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment,
which provides "an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this
sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct." Id. The Court rejected "the more
generalized notion of 'substantive due process'" as the appropriate guide in such
cases. Id.
157 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997); see also Landol-Rivera
v. Cruz Cosine, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 1990) ("We assume that claims of
excessive force outside the context of a seizure still may be analyzed under
substantive due process principles."); Sinaloa Lake Owners Assoc. v. City of Simi
Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1408 n.10 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
in SinaloaLake Owners Assoc. stated,
Graham does not, however, bar substantive due process analysis
altogether. A plaintiff may still state a claim for violation of substantive
due process where it is alleged that the government has used its power in
an abusive, irrational or malicious way in a setting not encompassed by
some other enumerated right.
Id. at 1408 n.10.
158 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. The claims of a pretrial detainee are not
cognizable under the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual
punishment, it does not apply "until after conviction and sentenc[ing]." Id. at 392
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D. Does a "Seizure"Under the FourthAmendment Extend
Beyond the InitialArrest?
The Fourth Amendment establishes that "the right of the
people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated."159 The Fourth Amendment
governs claims of excessive force during the course of an arrest,
investigatory stop, or other seizure of a person.160 The debate
over the proper constitutional standard to be applied to claims of
excessive force by law enforcement officials during the pretrial
detention period is centered on whether the Fourth Amendment
is directed at the actual arrest of an individual or whether it
161
includes conditions controlling subsequent pre-trial detention.
In defining a "seizure" in the context of an arrest, the
Supreme Court quoted Thompson v. Whitman 62 for the
proposition, "a seizure is a single act, and not a continuous
fact."1 63 Some courts have stated the Fourth Amendment does
not embrace the theory of a "continuing seizure" and does not
extend to the mistreatment of pretrial detainees in custody. 64

n.6. Also, a claim of excessive force cannot be examined until after the state has
secured "a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law."
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977). "Eighth Amendment
scrutiny is appropriate only after the state has complied with the constitutional
guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions." Id. The Court in
Grahamnoted the "Eighth Amendment 'serves as the primary source of substantive
protection ... in cases ... where the deliberate use of force is challenged as
excessive and unjustified.'" Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10 (quoting Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)).
159 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
160 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 6 n.7 (1985)
(addressing the constitutionality of the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of
an apparently unarmed suspected felon).
161 Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (recognizing there is a
"seizure" whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
to walk away), with Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192-93 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating
that the word "seizure" is limited to the initial arrest and not to subsequent events).
162 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873).
163 Thompson, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 471; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 16
(recognizing there is a "seizure" whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away); Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 193 ("A natural although
not inevitable interpretation of the word 'seizure' would limit it to the initial act of
seizing, with the result that subsequent events would be deemed to have occurred
after rather than during the seizure."); Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256
(10th Cir. 1994) (stating an officer's show of authority must succeed in restraining
the person in order for there to be a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment).
164 See Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding a

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.75:449

"Although the Graham opinion avoided a direct pronouncement
on this particular issue [of pretrial detention], the Court's
recognition of the broad applicability of [Flourth [Almendment
standards to excessive force claims in the arrest context has
played a role in the development of a standard applicable to post165
arrest police conduct."
The right to be secure from unreasonable seizures protects
an "individual's legitimate expectations that in certain places
and at certain times he has 'the right to be let alone.' "166 In
Terry v. Ohio,167 the Supreme Court acknowledged the breadth of
the "right to be let alone" and recognized that a seizure of a
person includes any conduct that "by means of physical force...
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen."168 Terry
states a very broad notion of what constitutes a seizure-one
compelling the conclusion that "any application of physical force
to a citizen which has the effect of disabling him physically to
169
any extent" is a seizure.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
in Justice v. Dennis,170 stated the Supreme Court "has long since
settled that a 'seizure' of a person within the Fourth
Amendment's meaning is not limited to conduct that constitutes
a 'technical arrest,' and instead encompasses any conduct that
'by means of physical force.., has in some way restrained the
liberty of a citizen."1 1 Clearly, because the liberty of an
individual is compromised, a "seizure" continues beyond the
pretrial detainee is protected against excessive force by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1443-45 (5th Cir.
1993) (holding the Fourth Amendment does not provide an appropriate
constitutional basis for protecting against deliberate uses of force and a pretrial
detainee receives protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Wilkins, 872 F.2d at 192-93 ("A natural although not inevitable
interpretation of the word 'seizure' would limit it to the initial act of seizing, with
the result that subsequent events would be deemed to have occurred after rather
than during the seizing.").
165 Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding the
constitutionality of law enforcement officers' entire course of conduct is to be
evaluated under the Fourth Amendment).
166 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
167 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
168 Id. at 20 n.16.
169 Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 388 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Phillips, J.,
dissenting).
170 834 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1987).
171 Id. at 387 (citing Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16).
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point of actual arrest to the post-arrest, pre-trail detention of a
citizen. 172 In Winston v. Lee, 173 the Supreme Court found the
Fourth Amendment is concerned with whether a citizen has been
subjected to "unreasonable governmental intrusions into any
174 If
area in which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy."
the citizen has been subjected to such intrusions, those
intrusions are unconstitutional regardless of the individual's
175
status as an arrestee, a pretrial detainee, or a prisoner.
PretrialDetaineesand Concerns of InstitutionalSecurity
In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court stated, "It is
clear.., that the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee
from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.'7 6
The Graham Court is referring to the fact that procedural due
process protects pretrial detainees from force that amounts to
177
punishment, rather than substantive due process rights.

E.

The Supreme Court has further recognized the Fourth Amendment does not
cease to apply simply because an arrest is complete. In both Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753 (1985), and Schmerber v. California,384 U.S. 757 (1966), the suspect's
arrest had been effected prior to the charged physical intrusions, yet in each case,
the Court applied the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment to judge
the constitutionality of the state's action. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 766; Schmerber,
470 U.S. at 767-68. In Schmerber, the court held admitting evidence obtained from
a warrantless blood test did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Schmerber, 384
U.S. at 766-72. In Winston, the court used a Fourth Amendment analysis to hold a
state could not compel a suspect to undergo surgery to remove bullets that could
provide evidence of the suspect's guilt or innocence. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 766;
see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) (using a
Fourth Amendment analysis to uphold the detention of a drug smuggler, so that law
enforcement officials could examine her feces). These decisions demonstrate that the
Fourth Amendment is not concerned with whether the excessive force was brought
to bear on the plaintiff when he was an "arrestee" or a "detainee."
173 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
174 Winston, 470 U.S. at 767 (emphasis added).
175 It would be strange if police were forbidden to use excessive force in making
an arrest, but free to beat the arrested person senseless as soon as the arrest was
complete-yet after he was convicted and imprisoned, were again forbidden-this
time by the Eighth Amendment from using excessive force amounting to
punishment. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-70.
176 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)).
177 See MacDonald, supra note 47, at 183-84 (stating that while due process
protects a pretrial detainee from force that amounts to punishment, it is not an
endorsement of the application of the substantive due process test to all claims of
excessive force by pretrial detainees). Moreover, the reference to the Due Process
Clause in Graham cannot be construed as an endorsement of the use of the
substantive due process test to pretrial detainee claims of excessive force, but rather
172
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Importantly, the portion of Bell v. Wolfish 178 cited by the
Supreme Court referred only to a detainee's procedural due
process, noting that under the Due Process Clause, a detainee
cannot be punished prior to a formal adjudication of guilt. 7 9
In Bell v. Wolfish, the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment
challenge by pretrial detainees to jail rules authorizing random
cell searches and visual body cavity searches. 80 The Court
stated that a pretrial detainee's expectations of privacy "would
be of a diminished scope" as a result of such practices.' 8 '
Similarly, in Hudson v. Palmer,8 2 the Court concluded the
Fourth Amendment protects neither a prisoner's privacy interest
in his prison cell nor his possessory interest in personal property
contained in his cell. 8 3 In Hudson, a convicted prisoner filed a §
1983 action claiming a search of his cell and seizure of his
property discovered during the search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. 8 4
The Court held that "the Fourth
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not
apply within the confines of the prison cell," 18 5 and stated,
"[S]ociety is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any
subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in
186
his prison cell."
It is important not to confuse a pretrial detainee's right to be
free from bodily intrusion under the Fourth Amendment with
the right of law enforcement officials to maintain institutional
security. To state that a detainee does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy from an inspection of his cell is not to say
he does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment against an arbitrary and excessive
beating. 8 7 The Court in Bell and Hudson did not address the
issue of whether an individual in a cell retains a legitimate
providing for procedural due process. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.
178 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
179 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535.
180See id. at 555-60. In Bell, the Supreme Court refused to hold that a pretrial
detainee has a privacy interest in his person that is protected by the Fourth
Amendment. See id.at 557.
181 Id. at 557.
182 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
183 See id. at 527-28.
184 See id. at 520.
185 Id. at 526.
186 Id.

187 See Freyermuth, supra note 34, at 704.
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expectation of privacy in his bodily integrity that protects him
from excessive force.188
While "maintaining institutional security and preserving
internal order and discipline are essential goals that may require
limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of
both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees," 8 9 this is not
always the case. 9 0 A pretrial detainee does not relinquish all
Fourth Amendment rights upon being taken into custody and
detained.' 9 1 While both pretrial detainees and convicted inmates
are subject to institutional security, not every pretrial detainee
will be found guilty. An arrestee does not lose his protection
under the Fourth Amendment simply because he is placed in a
cell, and there is no justification for affording a detainee less
protection against excessive force than is afforded an arrestee. 192
188 Rather, the Supreme Court in Bell examined conditions and restrictions of
pretrial detention alleged to be unconstitutional, such as "double-bunking," a
"publisher only" rule, and the practice of body cavity searches following contact
visits. "Double-bunking" is the practice of placing two inmates in a room designed
for one. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 541-43 (1979). The "publisher only" rule
allows inmates to receive published materials only if mailed directly from the
publisher or bookstore. See id. at 548-49. Nothing in Bell restricts the right of an
individual held in custody not to be "beaten or threatened" following their initial
arrest. Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 93-94 (4th Cir. 1991) (upholding an
individual's right not to be beaten and threatened during a custodial interrogation);
see also Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159, 1169-70 (4th Cir. 1997) (Michael, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the Fourth Amendment should be applied in cases of
excessive force during pretrial detention).
189 Bell, 441 U.S. at 546.
190In Bell, the Supreme Court stated there is no basis for concluding pretrial
detainees pose any lesser security risk than convicted inmates, and in a federal
system, a detainee is committed to a detention facility because there is no better
means to assure his presence at trial. See id. at 547 n.28.
191 But see Freyermuth, supra note 34, at 703 (stating that language in some
Supreme Court decisions implies that incarcerated pretrial detainees lose all their
Fourth Amendment rights).
192 See MacDonald, supra note 47, at 185. The author sets forth the following
example:
Two suspects, A and B, are arrested at the same time for the same offense.
For any physical encounter with the police during the respective arrests,
the [Flourth [A]mendment reasonableness standard will be applied to
evaluate any alleged police brutality. Assume that A and B are booked and
while A posts bail and is released, B cannot afford to post bail and is placed
in pretrial confinement. In any physical encounter between A and the
police while A is free on bail, the police may only use force objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. However, a correctional officer, in an
encounter with B, could use a greater amount of force against B, so long as
that force is not maliciously and sadistically applied for the purpose of
causing harm. There is simply no justification for treating A and B

478
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While concerns of institutional security will sometimes outweigh
a detainee's expectation of freedom from physical force, it will
not do so in every case. 193
IV.

ARRIVING AT A "REASONABLE" COMPROMISE

The protections provided by both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments are strikingly similar. Although there is no
fundamental right to be free from excessive force, 194 under both
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, an individual, whether
at liberty, detained, or incarcerated, has a certain expectation of
bodily integrity.195
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees "[tihe right to be free of state-occasioned damage to a
person's bodily integrity."196 This right includes freedom from
"state intrusions into realms of personal privacy and bodily
security through means so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as to
literally shock the conscience of the court." 97 The Fourteenth
Amendment "shocks the conscience" standard 198 under Johnson
v. Glick required the court to balance "the need for the
application of force [] [and] the relationship between the need
and the amount of force that was used." 199 This due process
standard also requires courts to consider issues such as the
officer's subjective state of mind or the extent of the plaintiffs
injury, which create a higher threshold for recovery under §
1983.200

differently simply because A had the financial means to post bail while B
did not.
Id. at 185-86.
193 See Freyermuth, supra note 34, at 704 (noting that a state's interest in
institutional security does not always outweigh a detainee's reasonable expectation
of privacy in his cell).
194 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989) (rejecting the idea that
there is a general "right" to be free from excessive force).
195 In her concurring opinion in Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966 (7th Cir.
1994), Justice Cudahy stated that "the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
'unreasonable' seizures is coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition
against deprivations of liberty without due process." Id. at 975 (Cudahy, J.,
concurring).
196 Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Hall v.
Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).
197 Hall, 621 F.2d at 613.
198 See supra notes 61-78 and accompanying text.
199 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
20o See Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970) (stating that
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The right to bodily integrity has also been premised on the
Fourth Amendment guarantee of "[tlhe right of... people to be
secure in their persons ... ."201
The application of force
implicates a person's Fourth Amendment right whenever that
person maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
202
bodily integrity that protects him from such intrusion.
Determining whether the force used is "reasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment standard 2 3 requires the court to "balance
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."20 4 An
officer's subjective state of mind or the extent of a plaintiffs
injuries are irrelevant when considering the rights implicated by
the use of force.
The most problematic feature is the state of mind
requirement of the Johnson test, which requires a court to
inquire into the officer's subjective state of mind to determine
whether the officer was motivated by a desire to maintain order
or a malicious intent to cause harm to the plaintiff.20 5 Thus, an
officer acting in good faith to maintain order could use
objectively unreasonable and unnecessary force on an arrestee
without violating their due process rights. 20 6 The government
cannot condone the application of force where none is justified or
once a constitutional violation has been made out under § 1983, a showing of malice
or intent to injure is not required to recover); Freyermuth, supra note 34, at 693.
201 Jenkins, 424 F.2d at 1232 (4th Cir. 1990) (stating it is clear that the Fourth
Amendment guarantee of person security "covers the individual's physical
integrity"); see also Shillingford, 634 F.2d at 265.
202 See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985) (Berger, C.J., concurring).
203 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
204 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); see also Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
205 See, e.g., Graham v. City of Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248-49 (W.D.N.C.
1986) (granting a defense motion for directed verdict, the court found that the force
used against the plaintiff was applied in a "good faith effort to maintain or restore
order in the face of a potentially explosive situation"), affd, 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1987), vacated sub. norm, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
206 See MacDonald, supra note 47, at 168-69 (stating that the subjective
inquiry into an officer's state of mind received a good deal of criticism from
commentators and § 1983 plaintiffs); Freyermuth, supra note 34, at 693, 700
(stating that an officer's subjective intent is often irrelevant under the Fourth and
Eighth Amendment tests developed by the Supreme Court to protect individuals
from excessive force by law enforcement officials); Campbell, supra note 59, at 1382
(arguing that "the substantive due process standard gives greater protection to
[unlawful] police conduct than does the [Fourth [A]mendment approach").
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condemn the application of excessive force only where there is
20 7
proof of malice.
Further, the extent of the injury inflicted is equally
irrelevant to the issue of whether there has been a violation of
an individual's constitutional rights. 208 Where an individual has
a reasonable expectation of security in his bodily integrity, any
injury caused by an intrusion is a violation of a constitutional
right.20 9 The "shocks the conscience" standard places too heavy a
burden on pretrial detainees who become the victims of the
excessive use of force by law enforcement officials.
As stated by the Eighth Circuit in Wilson v. Spain,210 it is
the "objective reasonableness" standard of the Fourth
Amendment that strikes the most appropriate balance between
the rights of a pretrial detainee and the governmental interest in
maintaining order. 2 11 The Court in Wilson properly applied the
Fourth Amendment to Wilson's claim that Officer Spain used
unreasonable force against him while he was in custody. 212 The
Eighth Circuit did not, however, have to distinguish between
standards applicable to a claim of excessive force during arrest
as opposed to pretrial detention. 213
Rather, the "objective
reasonableness" balancing under the Fourth Amendment applies
to any intrusion upon an individual's bodily integrity, regardless
of their status as arrestees or pretrial detainees.
V.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS

In addition to the constitutional analysis, the United States
is also bound by several international treaties that provide
guidance. Where the Constitution does not provide a clear
solution, the courts should be guided by international and civil
214
rights norms.
207 Under § 1983, once a constitutional violation has been made out, a showing
of malice or intent to injure is not required to recover. See Jenkins v. Averett, 424
F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970).
208 The extent of the injury inflicted "is probative of the amount of force used[,I"
however, and may bear on the sum to be awarded in damages. Norris v. District of
Columbia, 737 F.2d 1148, 1157 (U.S. App. D.C. 1984) (Doyle, J., concurring)
(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
209 See id.
210 209 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2000).
211 See id. at 716.
212 See id. at 716-17.
213 See id. at 715-16.
214 "In addition to violating state and federal law, the use of excessive force also
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There have been three major human rights treaties ratified
by the United States, in recent years. Once ratified, these
2 15
treaties are binding on the government as the law of the land.
While the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government are responsible for the submission and ratification
of treaties, once ratified the treaties are binding on all levels of
government-federal, state and municipal-and it is the duty of
216
all government officials to uphold these obligations.
Police abuse, including the excessive use of force by police
officers, is explicitly prohibited by two major international
217
human rights treaties to which the United States is a party.
In 1992, the United States ratified the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR sets forth
certain important civil and political rights, including the right to
life, freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, and the right
to privacy.2 18 ICCPR states,
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
219
social origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 6 of the ICCRP states: "Every human being has the
inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."22 0 Article 7 states,
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." 22 1 While none of these
provisions differentiate between arrestees, pretrial detainees
and prisoners, Article 10 requires that "[a]ll persons deprived of
their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for
violates international human rights law as set out in treaties to which the U.S. is a
party." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 111.
215 See id.

See id.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.
218 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The InternationalCovenant on Civil
and PoliticalRights, at http://wvw.lchr.org/ngo/ngoguide/covenent.htm.
219 G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1496th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/63162200
(1966).
220 Id. at pt. I, art. 6, § 1.
221 Id. at pt. III, art. 7.
216
217
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the inherent dignity of the human person."222 Additionally,
Article 26 asserts "[all persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the
law."22 3
Similar protections are included in the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or

Punishment,

224

which the United States ratified in

1994.225

In

addition to prohibiting torture, the State Parties have an
obligation "to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other
acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
which do not amount to torture."226 As ratified treaties, "these
covenants are now U.S. domestic law and, in some cases, should
provide enhanced human rights protections for those within the
U.8."227

Apart from legally binding treaties, there are other
2 28
international human rights standards addressing police abuse.
The United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement
Officials provides: "In the performance of their duty, law
enforcement officials shall respect and protect human dignity
and maintain and uphold the human rights of all
persons... [and] [1]aw enforcement officials may use force only
when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the
performance of their duty."2 29 The Code also states that "[n]o
Id. at pt. II, art. 10, § 1.
Id. at pt. III, art. 26.
G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 93d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter "U.N. Committee Against
Torture") entered into force in the United States on November 20, 1994. In October
1999, the United States submitted its first report to the U.N. Committee Against
Torture pursuant to its obligations under Article 19. See UNITED STATES
222

223
224
225

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE

U.N.
COMMITTEE
AGAINST
TORTURE,
at
http://www.state.gov/
www/global/humanrights/torturearticles.html.
226 G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 93d mtg., U.N. Doc. A11034 (1975).
227 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 113. The United States, however,
has ratified these treaties with "reservations, declarations and understandings that
carve away many of their expanded protections." See id. Principal among these is
the declaration that none of the treaties' provisions are self-executing, meaning that
upon ratification they do not automatically become available as the basis for
lawsuits, but must await the passage of implementing legislation. At the same time,
the Executive Branch specifically declares that no implementing legislation is
necessary because existing law provides adequate protections.
228 See id. at 115.
229 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 106th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/34/169 (1979).
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§ 1983 CLAIMS FOR EXCESSIVE FORCE

law enforcement official may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act
of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment .... " 230 While the code is not expressly binding, it
provides the courts with guidance for interpreting international
231
human rights law regarding policing.
As a leading nation in the fight against human rights
violations throughout the world, it is imperative that the United
States compel its courts to be guided by the fundamental human
dignity of all citizens, as outlined in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, when examining claims of excessive force by law
enforcement officials. Such human rights norms should be
applied in all cases examining claims of excessive force by
individuals regardless of their status as arrestees, pretrial
detainees or convicted prisoners.
CONCLUSION

The existing case law and constitutional standards do not
provide clear guidance for litigants in § 1983 excessive force
claims "beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial
detention begins. 232 What is clear is that individuals-whether
free, detained before trial or incarcerated-are protected from
the arbitrary and abusive use of force by law enforcement
officials.
Difficulty arises when trying to distinguish between an
arrestee and a pretrial detainee for the purposes of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The courts should apply the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard to claims of
excessive force prior to a formal adjudication of guilt. This
constitutional right, however must be applied with due
consideration for the concerns of institutional security existing
during the pretrial detention period. While pretrial detainees
may possess limited Fourth Amendment rights with regard to
property within their cell, they still possess Fourth Amendment
protection from unreasonable interference with bodily integrity.
The Fourteenth Amendment due process standard requires the
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Id.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 48, at 115.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1988).
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court to consider issues-such as an officer's subjective
motivation or the extent of the plaintiffs injury-that are
irrelevant under the standards set forth under the United States
Constitution and international human rights norms.
The decision of the Eighth Circuit in Wilson v. Spain233 only
highlights the confusion surrounding claims of excessive force
under § 1983. The courts must establish rules that discourage
frivolous cases without undermining the integrity and
consistency of constitutional standards. 234 Until the Supreme
Court elects to eliminate the split among the circuits with regard
to protection of pretrial detainees from excessive force by law
enforcement officials, the confusion will continue creating
uncertainty for those detained by law enforcement officials.

233

209 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2000).

234 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.

